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SUMMARY—As part of a broad evaluation of a 
reproductive health voucher programme aimed 
at determining its effect on health outcomes, a 
willingness to pay (WTP) study was conducted. The 
purpose of the study was to estimate WTP values 
for a broad range of reproductive health (RH) 
services namely: antenatal care (ANC), delivery, 
postnatal care (PNC) and family planning (FP) 
services. The study also sought to investigate the 
effect of the voucher programme on respondents’ 
stated WTP values for the RH services. Women 
utilizing RH services at both voucher and non-
voucher facilities were asked about their WTP 
for the RH services and WTP values were elicited 
using a stated preferences method. The study 
found that women were willing to pay a positive 
price to access RH services. Results also point 
to a differential learning effect or experience 
of the voucher on WTP for ANC, PNC, FP and 
delivery services. Further analysis also highlights 
endowment and reference effects with the 
voucher cost impacting on stated WTP amounts. 
The findings point to the potential for designing 
a sliding scale payment mechanism with effective 
targeting of subsidies such as vouchers to the 
neediest segments of the population. This will 
allow potential service users to pay for services 
within their willingness and ability to pay while 
also freeing resources to cater for the neediest 
segments of the population. 
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I nvesting in health is fundamental to any poverty reduction strategy as healthy individuals are key to the 
economic productivity of  any country. 
Both high and low-income countries 
finance health care using a mixture 
of  five possible sources: taxes, social 
insurance contributions, private insurance 
premiums, community financing and 
direct out-of-pocket payments through, 
for instance, user fees and patients’ direct 
payment to private providers.1 Faced 
with serious economic challenges, many 
governments in developing countries 
introduced user fees for health care as 
part of  a sector-wide approach to cost 
recovery and revenue generation.1,2 
However, available evidence suggests 
that some service price levels discourage 
health service utilization by the poor and 
drive individuals into poverty.3–6
Increasingly, governments in low-income 
countries and other purchasers of  health-
care services are experimenting with 
combinations of  demand and supply 
side financing mechanisms such as the 
use of  output-based aid (OBA) voucher 
subsidies. While supply-side investments 
aim at supporting the health system 
issues through initiatives such as capital 
investments, demand side financing 
structures target the health system user, 
driving them to utilize health facility 
based services. Such mechanisms include 
health voucher programmes which place 
purchasing power directly in the hands of  
potential health-care users, giving them 
choice of  health-care service providers 
and services. The strategies, mostly 
targeting the poor, have been used to 
improve uptake of  health-care services in 
developing countries.7–12 While vouchers 
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are not issued free of  charge, the cost is 
minimal with substantial benefits to the 
voucher holder, thus heavily subsidizing 
the cost of  health care. However, there 
have been concerns about the potential 
impact of  subsidies such as vouchers 
on adoption of  pricing mechanisms 
when the subsidy is withdrawn.7,13–16 The 
concerns arise from the fact that in health, 
like many other fields, decision makers 
are often faced with the challenge of  
balancing the need for equitable access 
to services especially for vulnerable low-
income populations and the desire to 
avoid setting prices that are too low to 
sustain programmes, which could lead to 
over-reliance on external funding.17 It is 
therefore imperative to price health-care 
services and products and charge those 
that can afford to pay a partial or full cost, 
which is then used to subsidize the cost 
of  care for those who cannot afford to 
pay for them.  
Setting optimal pricing levels for 
health-care services can be informed 
by individuals’ monetary valuation 
of  the benefits derived from the 
interventions.18–20 However, health 
interventions are not subject to the normal 
economic market for goods and services, 
making it difficult to value benefits that 
can be derived from them. Among the 
methodologies used to elicit individuals’ 
monetary valuations of  programme 
benefits include WTP studies.21–24 The 
theoretical foundations of  WTP as a 
measure of  commodity and service value 
are rooted in consumer demand theory.25 
Individual WTP values point to consumer 
choice behaviour or preferences with 
regard to particular goods or services.25 
WTP studies in the health sector build 
on the quality adjusted life year (QALY) 
measurement to elicit a dollar value from 
people for a good that is not subject to 
market pricing mechanisms.26,27 Individual 
preferences are weighted on money, 
health and time, with immediate and 
higher impact interventions expected to 
be valued higher than interventions where 
the outcome is expected at a future date 
or deemed to have a lower impact.  
A number of  possible scenarios have 
been identified in the literature regarding 
the possible influence of  health-care 
subsidies on individuals’ monetary 
valuation of  benefits. For instance, 
where the service has been obtained, 
beneficiaries are likely to be more willing 
to pay for subsequent use because they 
have experienced the true value of  the 
service – the learning effect.13 Subsidy 
beneficiaries may also anchor around the 
subsidy price and would be unwilling to 
pay more for the intervention later.13 The 
price of  the subsidy in this case acts as the 
reference point on which the stated WTP 
preferences are conditioned.14–16,28 In other 
cases, subsidies create an endowment 
effect whereby individuals’ stated WTP 
preferences are based on their experiences 
with the subsidized service or intervention 
(whether positive or negative). In the 
case of  positive experiences, the stated 
WTP value is expected to be higher 
while for negative experiences, the stated 
WTP value is expected to be lower.29 
In the case of  cost-free subsidies (such 
as childhood immunizations in many 
settings), beneficiaries easily develop an 
entitlement effect and are unwilling to pay 
any amount for the intervention later.14
Although output-based aid voucher 
programmes are increasingly being 
implemented in developing countries 
to improve the uptake of  health-care 
services especially among economically 
disadvantaged populations, there is limited 
understanding of  how and the extent 
to which they influence beneficiaries’ 
monetary valuation of  the subsidized 
services when the voucher is withdrawn. 
This article examines individuals’ WTP 
for RH services in Kenya. It specifically 
compares the likelihood that individuals 
were willing to pay and the amount they 
would be willing to pay for ANC, delivery, 
PNC and FP services among voucher 
and non-voucher clients. Information 
on WTP values for health-care services 
is useful for predicting utilization or 
demand for an intervention, services or 
commodities.18,19,30 When obtained before 
the rollout of  a health intervention, an 
analysis of  WTP values can also be used 
to determine the need for a subsidy.6,18,19,31 
In particular, if  the stated WTP is less 
than the real cost of  the intervention, 
then a subsidy would be needed to ensure 
equitable access to the services while 
higher stated WTP values may indicate 
the ability of  the specific population 
group to pay for the services and may be 
used in pricing level decisions.
Maternal health indicators in 
Kenya
Although the year set for achieving the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
targets32 is upon us, Kenya is far from 
attaining its indicators on maternal and 
child health. According to the Kenya 
Demographic and Health Survey 
(KDHS), maternal mortality increased 
from 414 in 2003 to 488 in 2008–09. 
Despite several interventions to improve 
health outcomes, skilled birth attendance 
(SBA) – which is recognized as a key 
strategy in addressing maternal mortality 
– is still low at 44%. Moreover, although 
92% of  expectant women receive 
ANC from a health-care provider, only 
44% of  births are delivered in a health 
facility. Only 47% of  mothers seek PNC 
care services while the contraceptive 
prevalence rate is 46%.33 Factors that 
contribute to the low uptake of  the 
health-care services in Kenya and similar 
settings include poverty, availability and 
spread of  health facilities, low literacy, 
shortage of  staff  and supplies, health-
care provider attitudes and sociocultural 
practices.33–38 Uptake of  RH services 
remains low especially among individuals 
from poor households.33 
Health-care financing in 
Kenya
Different policy instruments have been 
utilized by successive governments to 
finance health care in the country. From a 
predominantly tax-funded system in 1963, 
a variety of  cost recovery mechanisms 
including full cost (user fees) and 
registration fees have been used together 
with exemption mechanisms to cushion 
vulnerable segments of  the population 
from finance-related barriers to accessing 
health care. There is a national health 
insurance scheme that initially targeted 
the formal sector but successively 
opened up to include the informal sector. 
There are also private health insurance 
schemes while the government recently 
commissioned a social health insurance 
scheme. Under Article 43(1) (a) of  the 
Constitution of  Kenya, every person 
has the right to the highest attainable 
standard of  health, which includes the 
right to health-care services, including 
RH care.39 The full realization of  this 
right has, however, been hampered by 
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stunted economic growth coupled with 
competing financial needs against a fixed 
budget.
As a signatory to the Abuja Declaration, 
Kenya committed itself  to allocating 
at least 15% of  the national budget to 
the health sector.40 However, more than 
a decade after signing the declaration, 
government funding for health care has 
remained consistently below 5%.41 In 
2009–10, the government contributed 
30% of  the health budget, households 
and other private sources contributed 
54%, while donors contributed 16%. 
However, the total health expenditure 
for RH accounted for 14% of  total health 
spending and 1% of  GDP in 2009–10, a 
level that has remained unchanged since 
2005–2006.42 Public and private sectors 
(including households) were the primary 
sources of  RH care financing during the 
period of  analysis with contributions of  
40% and 38% respectively.42 Household 
financing of  health care is largely through 
formal and informal out-of-pocket 
payments, which have been linked to poor 
uptake of  facility services, hence poor 
maternal health outcomes. It is against 
this backdrop that the Government of  
Kenya began implementing the RH 
vouchers programme (described in 
detail in the next section) in selected 
regions of  the country. The government 
further declared a policy of  free maternal 
health services (ANC, delivery and PNC 
services) in all public health facilities in 
2013.43 Following the policy shift, public 
health facilities have reported influxes in 
the numbers of  maternal delivery.44  
The reproductive health 
vouchers programme in 
Kenya
Through funding from the German 
Development  Bank (KfW),  an 
output-based aid (OBA) RH voucher 
programme has been implemented by 
the Government of  Kenya since 2006. 
The OBA concept represents a demand-
side approach to financing health care 
by subsidizing health-care clients directly 
and dispensing money to health facilities 
only when services are actually provided. 
The programme, described in detail 
elsewhere12,45–47 is implemented in select 
sites within three districts (now counties): 
(Kisumu, Kitui and Kiambu) and two 
urban slums (Viwandani and Korogocho) 
in Nairobi since 2006. The programme 
was expanded to one additional county 
(Kilifi) in 2011. The objective of  the 
programme is to significantly reduce 
maternal and neonatal morbidity and 
mortality by increasing the number of  
health facility deliveries and improving 
access to appropriate RH services 
for the poor through incentives for 
increased demand and improved service 
provision.8,48,49  
Using a non-standard poverty-grading 
tool, community-based distributors 
appointed by the voucher management 
agency screen self-selecting pregnant 
women and potential FP clients, who, if  
eligible, purchase a safe motherhood or 
FP voucher respectively at a minimal fee 
or are given for free if  living in extreme 
poverty. The safe motherhood voucher 
costs KSh 200 (US$ 2.50) and covers four 
ANC visits, normal or surgical delivery, 
pregnancy complications and PNC for 
the mother and baby up to six weeks. 
The FP voucher costs KSh 100 (US$1.25) 
and covers long-term and permanent 
methods (contraceptive implants, 
intrauterine contraceptive device and 
voluntary tubal ligation). A third voucher 
for gender-based violence recovery 
(GBVR) services is issued for free at 
selected health facilities to gender-based 
violence (GBV) survivors. The voucher 
covers consultation, counselling services, 
laboratory examinations and treatment of  
conditions arising from GBV.
Beneficiaries present the vouchers for 
services at the more than 150 accredited 
health (voucher) facilities comprising 
public, private for-profit and private not-
for-profit. Following service provision, 
facilities submit invoices to the voucher 
management agency for payment against 
pre-agreed reimbursement rates. The RH 
voucher programme has been evaluated 
on several facets including its impact on 
access to services,50 impact on quality 
of  care51 and the economic costs of  
providing the different RH programme 
services (unpublished work).  
Evaluation of  the programme has shown 
improved service utilization among the 
target population.49,11,50
Methods
Data
Data for this analysis and paper was 
collected during exit interviews with 
clients seeking ANC, PNC and FP 
services in selected health facilities in 
Kenya. The study was conducted between 
July and October 2012 as part of  a larger 
project that evaluated the impact of  
reproductive vouchers programmes in 
five countries (Kenya, Uganda, United 
Republic of  Tanzania, Cambodia and 
Bangladesh). 
A total of  33 health facilities were 
randomly sampled from among those 
that were accredited to provide services to 
voucher beneficiaries. The sampling was 
stratified by programme site (Kisumu, 
Kitui, Kiambu, Kilifi and Nairobi), facility 
level (hospital, health centre/maternity/
nursing home and dispensary/clinic) 
and facility type of  ownership (public, 
private, faith-based and NGO). A further 
18 health facilities were sampled from 
adjacent non-voucher sites (Makueni, 
Nyandarua and Uasin Gishu counties) 
for comparison. Health facilities in the 
comparison sites were selected on the 
basis of  how comparable they were to 
those sampled from voucher sites in terms 
of  level and type of  ownership. In the 
absence of  pre-implementation data, the 
study authors chose to compare voucher 
and non-voucher clients in an effort 
to separate the effect of  the voucher 
programme on stated WTP values. 
The study targeted expectant women 
making the first (under 24 weeks) and 
last (36 weeks or more) ANC visit; 
postpartum women seeking PNC services 
within 48 hours, two weeks, and four 
to six weeks after delivery; and women 
seeking FP services. As part of  the larger 
programme evaluation, the women were 
first observed during consultation with 
the providers to determine the quality of  
care they received. The observations were 
conducted by trained nurses who were 
deployed outside the study area. Quality 
of  care assessments were conducted 
using a different tool to the one used to 
capture stated WTP values. The detailed 
methodology and results of  the quality of  
care assessments are not presented in this 
article but covered in detail in a separate 
focused paper.51
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WTP data were captured using a 
structured questionnaire administered 
during exit interviews. Following the 
observations described above, clients 
were interviewed after consultation 
sessions by trained research assistants. 
The structured questionnaires used during 
the exit interviews captured information 
on the clients’ background characteristics 
(including age, education level, marital 
status and household income); 
childbearing experiences and intentions; 
perceptions about the services received; 
accessibility to the facility (mode and time 
of  travel); out-of-pocket expenditure and 
WTP for the services including a stated 
WTP value for the different RH services; 
as well as awareness, use and perceptions 
about the vouchers. PNC clients were 
also asked about their experiences during 
delivery.
Written informed consent was obtained 
from all participants before conducting 
the observations and interviews. The 
interviews were conducted in English, 
Swahili (the national language) or the 
local language depending on which one a 
participant was comfortable with. Ethical 
approval for the study was obtained from 
the Population Council Institutional 
Review Board (Protocol No. 470) and 
the Kenya Medical Research Institute 
(Protocol No. 174).
Analysis
Analysis involved descriptive statistics 
(means and percentages) as well as 
estimation of  multivariate regression 
models. We compared the proportions 
of  voucher and non-voucher clients who 
indicated that they were willing to pay for 
ANC, delivery, PNC and FP services and 
tested whether there were any significant 
differences between the two groups. We 
further compared the average amount of  
money that voucher and non-voucher 
clients were willing to pay for the services 
and tested whether differences, if  any, 
were statistically significant. Voucher 
clients in this case referred to those who 
had ever used FP or safe motherhood 
vouchers even if  they did not use it on 
the day of  the interview.
Multivariate regression analysis, on the 
other hand, involved estimation of  logistic 
and ordinary least squares regression 
models for the likelihood of  WTP and 
the amount of  money clients were willing 
to pay for services respectively. A total of  
eight models were estimated. The first 
four models examined differences in the 
likelihood of  WTP for the services (ANC, 
delivery, PNC and FP) among voucher 
and non-voucher clients. The results are 
presented as odds ratios. The next set 
of  four models examined differences in 
the amount voucher and non-voucher 
clients were willing to pay for the services. 
The results are presented as coefficient 
estimates. The models adjusted for 
clustering of  individuals within the same 
facility. The basic form of  the model is 
given by the following equation: 
Yij = 0 + i Xij+ j
where Yij is the amount paid by individual 
i in facility j, 0 is the constant, Xij is 
the vector of  covariates including the 
indicator of  whether one was a voucher 
client or not, i is the associated vector 
of  fixed parameters and j is the error 
term for individuals identified from the 
same facility. The models controlled 
for age, highest education level, marital 
status at the time of  interview, parity, 
household wealth index, type and level of  
facility. The definitions and measurement 
of  variables included in the regression 
models are presented in Table 1.
Results
Interviews were completed with 419 out 
of  432 ANC clients (97%), 554 out of  
568 PNC clients (98%) and 212 out of  
216 FP clients (98%).  
Characteristics of women
Table 2 presents the distribution of  ANC, 
PNC and FP clients that were successfully 
interviewed upon exit by background 
characteristics and use of  voucher. There 
were no significant variations in the 
distribution of  voucher and non-voucher 
clients seeking various services (ANC, 
PNC and FP) by age and marital status. 
However, voucher and non-voucher 
clients seeking ANC and PNC services 
significantly differed in terms of  highest 
level of  education, household wealth 
status, and the facility from where they 
were interviewed. In particular the highest 
proportion of  voucher clients seeking 
ANC and PNC services had primary level 
education (57% and 68% respectively). 
By contrast, the highest proportion 
of  non-voucher clients seeking these 
services had secondary and above level 
of  education (57% and 52% respectively). 
Similarly, higher proportions of  non-
voucher compared to voucher clients 
Table 1. Definitions and measurement of variables included in regression 
analysis
Variable definition Measurement
Outcome variables
Willing to pay for services (ANC, delivery, PNC, FP) 0 = No
1 = Yes
Amounts clients are willing to pay Continuous: 
Ranges from KSh 10 to KSh 2000 for ANC
Ranges from KSh 20 to KSh 25000 for delivery care
Ranges from KSh 10 to KSh 8000 for PNC
Ranges from KSh 20 to KSh 1000 for FP
Covariates
Client type 0 = Non-voucher client
1 = Voucher client
Current age of the respondent Continuous:
Ranges from 15 to 44 for ANC clients
Ranges from 15 to 49 for delivery and PNC clients
Ranges from 17 to 49 for FP clients
Education level 0 = No schooling/pre-unit/primary
1 = Secondary and above
Current marital status 0 = Never/formerly married1 = Married/living together
Household wealth index 0 = Other 60%1 = Poorest 40%
Parity
Continuous:
Ranges from 1 to 5 for ANC clients
Ranges from 1 to 7 for delivery, PNC and FP clients 
Facility type 0 = Private1 = Public
Facility level
1 = Hospital
2 = Health centre/maternity/nursing home
3 = Dispensary/clinic
Kenya shilling (KSh): US$ 1 ≈ KSh 88
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seeking the services were from the two 
bottom quintiles. In addition, although 
the majority of  clients were from public 
health facilities, a higher proportion of  
non-voucher compared to voucher clients 
was from these facilities.
Willingness to pay for 
services
Table 3 shows the distribution of  
voucher and non-voucher clients by 
WTP for RH services. There was no 
significant difference in the proportion 
of  voucher and non-voucher clients that 
were willing to pay for ANC services 
(35% and 33% respectively; p=0.67). 
However, a significantly lower proportion 
of  voucher compared with non-voucher 
clients were willing to pay for delivery 
(34% and 43% respectively; p<0.05) and 
FP services (25% and 44% respectively; 
Table 2. Percentage distribution of voucher and non-voucher clients by background characteristics and services sought
Antenatal care (%) Delivery/postnatal care (%) Family planning (%)
Characteristics Voucher clients
Non-voucher 
clients Voucher clients
Non-voucher 
clients Voucher clients
Non-voucher 
clients
Age (years) p=0.30 p=0.25 p=0.93
15–24 50.0 47.9 52.4 44.7 39.6 37.1
25–34 40.1 45.0 35.6 38.9 47.2 47.8
35 and above 8.8 7.1 10.3 14.5 13.2 14.5
Don’t know/missing 1.1 0.0 1.7 1.9 0.0 0.6
Highest education level p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.05
No schooling/pre-unit 6.6 2.9 7.9 2.3 9.4 3.1
Primary 57.1 39.9 67.8 46.2 66.0 58.5
Secondary and above 36.3 57.1 24.3 51.5 24.5 38.4
Current marital status p=0.78 p=0.62 p=0.87
Never married 15.4 13.9 11.6 13.4 11.3 9.4
Married/living together 80.8 83.2 86.0 83.2 84.9 85.5
Formerly married 3.9 2.9 2.4 3.4 3.8 5.0
Parity p=0.16 p=0.01 p=0.54
0 37.4 41.6 0.3 3.4 0.0 3.1
1–2 38.5 42.9 52.1 63.4 54.7 57.9
3–4 19.2 11.8 33.6 24.4 32.1 27.0
5 and above 5.0 3.8 14.0 8.8 13.2 12.0
Household wealth index p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.32
Poorest quintile 11.0 34.5 8.2 30.5 9.4 17.6
Poorer quintile 19.8 20.2 21.2 19.1 17.0 22.0
Middle quintile 26.4 11.8 25.7 19.9 26.4 17.6
Richer quintile 19.8 18.1 25.7 16.0 18.9 21.4
Richest quintile 23.1 15.6 19.2 14.5 28.3 21.4
Facility type p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01
Private 37.9 19.8 40.4 19.1 41.5 13.8
Public 62.1 80.3 59.6 80.2 58.5 86.2
Facility level p=0.08 p<0.01 p<0.01
Hospital 50.6 60.1 55.5 66.4 20.8 52.8
Health centre/maternity/nursing home 46.2 38.7 39.7 32.4 67.9 46.5
Dispensary/clinic 3.3 1.3 4.8 1.2 11.3 0.6
Number of women 182 238 292 262 53 159
Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding; p values are from chi-square tests of differences between voucher and non-voucher clients
p<0.05). By contrast, a significantly 
higher proportion of  voucher compared 
with non-voucher clients were willing 
to pay for PNC services (47% and 39% 
respectively; p<0.05). The results further 
show that voucher clients were willing 
to pay significantly lower amounts for 
ANC (p<0.05), delivery (p<0.01) and 
PNC services (p<0.01) compared with 
non-voucher clients (Table 3). It is also 
worth noting that, on average, voucher 
clients were willing to pay lower amounts 
than the voucher price for ANC and FP 
services. By contrast, they were willing to 
pay almost three times higher for delivery 
than the voucher price and almost the 
same price for PNC as the voucher price 
(Table 3).
Results from the multivariate logistic 
regression analysis show that voucher 
clients were significantly less likely to 
express WTP for ANC, delivery and FP 
services compared with non-voucher 
clients (p<0.05 in each case; Table 4). 
There was, however, no significant 
difference between voucher and non-
voucher clients in the likelihood of  
expressing WTP for PNC services. 
Other results from the analysis show 
that clients with secondary and above 
level of  education were significantly more 
likely to report WTP for delivery services 
compared with those with lower levels 
of  education (odds ratio: 1.65; p<0.01). 
In addition, contrary to what would be 
expected, women from the poorest 40% 
of  households and those who sought 
services from dispensaries or clinics 
were significantly more likely to report 
WTP for ANC services compared with 
those from the other 60% households 
and those who sought services from 
hospitals respectively (p<0.05 in each 
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case). By contrast, women who sought 
services from health centres, nursing or 
maternity homes were significantly less 
likely to express WTP for ANC services 
compared with those who sought services 
Table 3. Distribution of voucher and non-voucher clients by willingness to pay 
for reproductive health services
Voucher clients Non-voucher clients
Indicator Estimate Number of cases Estimate Number of cases
Proportions willing to pay for services (%)
Antenatal care 35.2 182 33.2 238
Delivery care 33.6 292 42.8* 262
Postnatal care 47.3 292 38.6* 262
Family planning 24.5 53 44.0* 159
Mean amount clients are willing to pay (KSh)
Antenatal care 67.53 170 130.14* 138
Delivery care 706.40 267 1776.63** 169
Postnatal care 198.80 275 474.98** 191
Family planning 34.23 52 42.89 152
Median amount clients are willing to pay (KSh)
Antenatal care 0.0 170 40.0 138
Delivery care 0.0 267 500.0 169
Postnatal care 10.0 275 20.0 191
Family planning 0.0 52 0.0 152
Kenya shilling (KSh): US$ 1 ≈ KSh 88; Differences between voucher and non-voucher clients are statistically significant at: 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01. Number of cases = number of individuals responding to the question. Estimates for proportions willing to pay 
for services = percentage based on the total number of respondents for the question. Estimates for the WTP values = absolute 
values in KSh. 
Table 4. Odds ratios from logistic regression models for the likelihood of willing to pay for reproductive health services 
among voucher and non-voucher clients
Covariates Antenatal care Delivery care Postnatal care Family planning
Voucher client (yes = 1) 0.55* (0.31; 0.99) 0.32** (0.19; 0.54) 0.87 (0.42; 1.79) 0.36* (0.14; 0.94)
Age (single years) 0.96 (0.90; 1.03) 0.98 (0.92; 1.05) 0.95* (0.91; 0.99) 1.02 (0.97; 1.09)
Highest education level (secondary and above = 1) 1.51 (0.99; 2.29) 1.65** (1.16; 2.35) 1.35 (0.91; 2.01) 0.91 (0.50; 1.67)
Current marital status (married/living together = 1) 0.99 (0.49; 2.03) 0.82 (0.45; 1.47) 0.89 (0.51; 1.57) 1.09 (0.50; 2.36)
Parity (continuous) 1.19 (0.97; 1.47) 1.02 (0.83; 1.25) 1.19 (0.99; 1.42) 0.79 (0.62; 1.01)
Household wealth index (poorest 40% = 1) 1.67* (1.03; 2.67) 1.16 (0.98; 2.66) 1.57 (0.97; 2.52) 0.79 (0.38; 1.62)
Facility type (public = 1) 1.13 (0.53; 2.42) 0.72 (0.38; 1.39) 0.47 (0.21; 1.08) 0.62 (0.28; 1.37)
Facility level (ref = hospital)
Health centre/maternity 0.48* (0.24; 0.96) 0.87 (0.46; 1.67) 0.55 (0.26; 1.15) 0.92 (0.45; 1.89)
Dispensary/clinic 1.92* (1.01; 3.62) 0.64 (0.10; 4.26) 0.55 (0.10; 3.17) 0.57 (0.20; 1.60)
Number of cases 305 426 458 203
Ref: reference category; *p<0.05; **p<0.01
from hospitals (p<0.05; Table 4).
Table 5 presents coefficient estimates from 
ordinary least squares regression analysis 
for amounts that clients were willing to 
pay for various RH services. Voucher 
clients were willing to pay significantly 
lower amounts for delivery and PNC 
services compared to non-voucher 
clients (p<0.01 in each case). There 
was, however, no significant difference 
between voucher and non-voucher clients 
in the amounts they were willing to pay 
for ANC and FP services. Other results 
show that women with secondary and 
above level of  education were willing 
to pay significantly higher amounts for 
ANC compared with those with lower 
levels of  education (p<0.05). In addition, 
women who sought services from public 
health facilities and dispensaries/clinics 
were willing to pay significantly lower 
amounts for PNC compared with those 
who sought services from private facilities 
and hospitals respectively (p<0.05 and 
p<0.01 respectively).
Discussion and 
conclusion
This study explored WTP for RH services 
among poor women within the context of  
Table 5. Coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares regression models for the amount clients are willing to pay 
for reproductive health services
Covariates Antenatal care Delivery care Postnatal care Family planning
Voucher client (yes = 1) -52.12 (-118.65; 14.40) -814.26** (-1355.06; -273.45) -290.20** (-486.21; -94.19) -13.02 (-45.27; 19.24)
Age (single years) -4.47 (-10.37; 0.89) 93.73 (-11.55; 199.01) -4.03 (-18.06; 10.00) 0.41 (-3.93; 4.76)
Highest education level (secondary and above = 1) 66.81* (13.48; 120.14) 241.54 (-364.00; 847.09) 224.16 (-8.08; 456.40) 0.56 (-25.95; 27.06)
Current marital status (married/living together = 1) -4.87 (-83.27; 73.52) -642.79 (-1501.00; 215.42) -11.67 (-224.99; 201.66) -16.83 (-68.46; 34.79)
Parity (continuous) 14.33 (-5.04; 33.70) -280.33 (-671.86; 111.20) 25.37 (-22.98; 74.72) -5.44 (-19.43; 8.56)
Household wealth index (poorest 40% = 1) 13.40 (-49.14; 75.94) 495.06 (-273.61; 1263.72) -73.64 (-244.62; 97.34) -19.22 (-42.59; 4.14)
Facility type (public = 1) -33.03 (-123.60; 57.55) -582.69 (-1344.04; 178.65) -248.38* (-492.34; -4.42) -24.75 (-57.95; 8.46)
Facility level (ref = hospital)
Health centre/maternity -64.28 (-130.95; 2.38) 45.44 (-640.76; 731.85) -129.44 (-325.57; 66.70) -8.26 (-39.78; 23.26)
Dispensary/clinic -9.95 (-91.52; 71.61) -570.85 (-1489.99; 348.30) -213.97** (-362.89; -65.05) -17.40 (-62.85; 28.05)
Constant 242.65* (43.38; 441.91) 588.90 (-1365.14; 2542.94) 719.70** (296.37; 1143.02) 92.55* (6.54; 178.56)
Number of cases 305 426 458 203
Ref: reference category; *p<0.05; **p<0.01
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a voucher programme and comparable 
non-voucher sites. In addition to 
estimating average WTP values for the 
RH services, this study explored the effect 
of  the subsidy (voucher/voucher price) 
on WTP for similar services in future.
A key finding of  this study was that 
clients are willing to pay a positive price 
for the four reproductive health services: 
ANC, delivery, PNC and FP. This finding 
mirrors findings in other studies on the 
effect of  vouchers on utilization of  
facility based RH services in which the 
voucher is associated with improvements 
in quality of  care and perceived benefit of  
attending facility based services leading to 
the increased utilization of  facility based 
services.12,48,50 
A second finding from these results was 
that experiencing the services – learning 
effect of  the voucher subsidy impacts 
differently for the different RH services. 
A negative effect of  the voucher was 
observed in the lower proportions of  
voucher clients compared with non-
voucher clients, willing to pay for ANC, 
delivery and FP services while the 
voucher positively impacts on WTP for 
PNC services with more voucher than 
non-voucher clients expressing WTP for 
the services in future. In the design of  the 
voucher programme before 2014, clients 
were expected to access PNC services 
using the safe motherhood voucher. 
However, the facility reimbursement 
policy for PNC services offered was not 
clear as this was lumped into delivery 
services and thus many facilities did not 
consider PNC services after delivery 
and discharge to be part of  the voucher 
benefits. It is possible therefore that 
voucher clients paid to access PNC 
services for services offered post 
discharge. Anecdotal evidence collected 
from voucher clients in the process of  
the wider programme evaluation points 
to poor attitudes towards voucher paying 
clients at voucher facilities, compared 
with regular fee-paying clients. These 
clients intimated that at some of  the 
facilities, providers felt that the voucher 
programme had led to an influx of  clients 
in their facilities increasing their workload 
yet they were not compensated for the 
extra workload. This was observed more 
in the public facilities where facility 
earnings from the voucher programme 
did not directly impact financially on 
the service providers. Some of  the 
service providers in such facilities gave 
preferential treatment to the fee-paying 
clients, with voucher clients attended to 
after these had been served. Poor provider 
attitudes to clients have been documented 
in other studies as a leading cause of  
non-utilization of  health facilities.34 These 
contributed to the clients’ decision to 
conceal the voucher, using it only if  they 
were in an emergency situation.52 Such 
experiences would lead to the low stated 
WTP values for these services when 
offered in the context of  a voucher 
programme. The low stated WTP values 
could also be attributed to normalization 
of  services such as ANC and delivery in 
majority of  the communities within the 
study area, as shown in other studies.34,38 
In these, pregnancy is not associated with 
any dangers and thus facility attendance 
is reserved for emergencies. The learning 
effect also influences the WTP amounts 
with voucher clients willing to pay less for 
ANC, delivery services and PNC services. 
Data on the FP service clients are very 
limited and the resulting analysis is not 
sufficiently convincing. 
A third major finding is the effect of  
the current voucher price on the stated 
WTP amounts for all the services – the 
reference point effect. Overall, voucher 
clients are less likely to express WTP for 
ANC, delivery and FP services, compared 
with non-voucher clients. This could also 
be tied to the above finding on the effect 
of  previous experiences with services 
offered using the voucher. With a cost 
price of  KSh 200 for the safe motherhood 
voucher, voucher clients are willing to pay 
lower than this price for ANC and FP 
services but almost three times this price 
for delivery services. Normalization of  
ANC and FP services could contribute 
to this. In this, delivery is associated with 
higher health risks compared with ANC 
and FP and thus higher WTP values are 
stated for this. The voucher price does 
not have an effect on WTP price for 
PNC services.  
The study findings concur with findings 
in other studies where subsidies have been 
shown to have a learning effect on stated 
WTP for the services.13–15,18 The same 
studies have also pointed to the potential 
negative effect of  the subsidy cost as 
used as a reference point, on stated WTP 
amounts. Findings from this and similar 
studies can be used to set minimum 
price levels for health commodities and 
services, allowing those in the society 
who can pay a non-zero price to access 
health care to do so. Interventions aimed 
at addressing disrespectful and abusive 
care towards clients, which includes 
discrimination on the basis of  their 
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socioeconomic background, are ongoing 
in the country.53 It is hoped that these 
will reduce the perceived discrimination 
of  voucher clients on the basis of  
ownership of  the voucher, encouraging 
equal treatment for equal need.  
As has been the case with other 
studies18,19,54 findings from this WTP 
study could help project the market size 
for RH services if  these were priced.
To generate further evidence for resource 
allocation and pricing decisions, variations 
of  the different methods of  eliciting 
WTP values should be conducted on 
the same sample as has been suggested 
by Foreit17. This further helps to validate 
the stated WTP values. In addition, an 
in-depth evaluation of  the reasons for 
the stated WTP values and non-WTP for 
services would aid in redesigning payment 
mechanisms. p
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